USA · snapshot 2026-10-19 00:22 UTC · data to 2026-08-01

Semiconductor and AI infrastructure capacity

Is the physical capacity behind AI (fabs, power, materials) expanding fast enough to meet announced demand?

No stored series for silicon-metal-production yet (metric is registered but not published); the page shows what is available.

DerivedModeled

Section 1 of 9

What changed?

Observed and derived series only. Changes are latest minus the value one, five and ten years earlier.

AI narrative Modeled

silicon-metal-production (WLD) remains unpublished. Rare earth mine production reached 390000 metric tons in 2025 versus 380000 metric tons in 2024 [obs:263991] [obs:263978]. US nonresidential construction spending reached 1308532 millions of dollars in 2026-08 versus 1301989 in 2025-08 [obs:410855] [obs:179168]. US electricity net generation reached 399671.285 million kilowatthours in 2026-06 versus 393284.833 in 2025-06 [obs:410783] [obs:245385].

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Supporting series

Rare earth mine production

Observed

Magnet and process inputs.

390,000 metric tons

2025

Span	From	Change	Percentile
1 period	380,000 (2024)	10,000 (+2.6%)	n/a
1 year	380,000 (2024)	10,000 (+2.6%)	n/a
5 years	series too short	n/a	n/a
10 years	series too short	n/a	n/a

Supporting series

US nonresidential construction spending

Observed

Includes fab and data-centre construction.

1.31M millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate

2026-08-01

Span	From	Change	Percentile
1 period	1.3M (2026-07-01)	9,053 (+0.7%)	66th
1 year	1.3M (2025-08-01)	6,543 (+0.5%)	9th of 283
5 years	844,011 (2021-08-01)	464,521 (+55.0%)	97th of 235
10 years	733,506 (2016-08-01)	575,026 (+78.4%)	81st of 175

Supporting series

US electricity net generation

Observed

The power the new load must come from.

399,671.29 million kilowatthours

2026-06-01

Span	From	Change	Percentile
1 period	354,690.53 (2026-05-01)	44,980.76 (+12.7%)	91st
1 year	393,284.83 (2025-06-01)	6,386.45 (+1.6%)	43rd of 629
5 years	373,856.48 (2021-06-01)	25,814.81 (+6.9%)	62nd of 581
10 years	367,903.54 (2016-06-01)	31,767.74 (+8.6%)	37th of 521

silicon-metal-production (WLD): not published, metric is registered but not published

Section 2 of 9

How unusual is it?

The primary series against its own stored history (features_v1 rarity and surprise).

AI narrative Modeled

No primary series stored, so unusualness is not computed. Evidence: none.

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Not computed: the primary series is not stored, so there is no history to compare against.

Section 3 of 9

Why might it be happening?

Documented mechanisms, statistical model drivers, hypotheses and unknowns are kept apart.

AI narrative Modeled

Documented mechanisms: AI compute demand pulls on accelerators, memory, leading-edge fabs, and the electricity and water those fabs use [mechanism:b735fd46-d9c5-4c63-a93e-8b408410b01d]. Statistical model drivers: none stored. Hypotheses: AI compute affects Economic output [rel:812f2c15-fcfa-420c-b874-302b1bf79647]. Unknown: No public series measures leading-edge wafer capacity; announced data-centre capacity is not the same as energised capacity.

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Reviewed

Documented mechanisms

AI compute demand pulls on accelerators, memory, leading-edge fabs, and the electricity and water those fabs use
Established relationai-compute → ai-accelerator → semiconductor-fab → electricity-system

Statistical

Model-supported drivers

Modeled

No active forecast for this topic records driver contributions (the champion may be a baseline with no drivers).

Candidate or hypothesized relationships

Hypotheses

AI compute affects Economic output Candidate
Proposed: productivity effects of AI compute on output. No mechanism reviewed and no evidence attached.

Not settled by stored data

Unknowns

No public series measures leading-edge wafer capacity; the site stores upstream materials and corporate pulses instead.
Announced data-centre capacity is not the same as energised capacity; the gap between the two is not stored.

Section 4 of 9

What has not changed?

Fundamentals judged against the 10th to 90th percentile band of their own year-over-year changes (or of their levels when the history is short).

AI narrative Modeled

R&D expenditure as share of GDP at 2.59737836465431 percent of GDP lies inside the 1.961711 to 2.476088 band [obs:102615]. OECD-industrial-production (WLD) has no observations stored.

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Series	Latest	Basis	Normal band (p10 to p90)	Historical range	Reading
R&D expenditure as share of GDP Observed R&D as a share of world GDP.	2.6 percent of GDP 2023, obs 102615	year-over-year change 0.0262 (+1.0%) 26 past changes	-0.0353 to 0.0754	1.92 (2007) to 2.6 (2023) since 1996; latest at the 100th percentile of levels	within its normal band
Researchers per million people Observed Researchers per million people.	1,651.59 researchers per million people 2020, obs 118861	level 6 observations	1,137.96 to 1,587.7	1,080.91 (2000) to 1,651.59 (2020) since 2000; latest at the 100th percentile of levels	outside its normal band

oecd-industrial-production (WLD): no observations, no current observations for WLD

Section 5 of 9

What absorbs the shock?

Each buffer names the series or graph entity that evidences it, or says it is not measured.

AI narrative Modeled

Imports, spare capacity, inventory and substitution are not measured. Diversification shows rare earth production top-3 country concentration at 89.7 percent of world production [obs:409075]. Financing shows US real private fixed investment at 4645.786 billions of chained 2017 dollars [obs:410752].

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Imports

Not measured

No stored series evidences this buffer.

rare-earth-us-net-import-reliance is referenced but not available (see gaps). US net import reliance for rare earths.

Geographic diversification

Rare earth production top-3 country concentration

Derived

89.7 percent of world production · 2025 · yoy -1.1% · obs 409075

Three-country share of rare-earth output.

Financing

US real private fixed investment

Observed

4,645.79 billions of chained 2017 dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate · 2026-04-01 · yoy +4.1% · obs 410752

Real private fixed investment carries the build-out.

Spare capacity

Not measured

No stored series evidences this buffer.

Fab utilisation is not published as a public series.

Inventory

Not measured

No stored series evidences this buffer.

Accelerator and memory inventories are not ingested.

Substitution

Not measured

No stored series evidences this buffer.

Substitution between accelerator generations is not measured here.

rare-earth-us-net-import-reliance (USA): not published, metric is registered but not published

Section 6 of 9

What response is underway?

Capacity pipeline, corporate pulses, capital spending and production series, with their year-over-year change.

AI narrative Modeled

Corporate pulse semiconductor capacity capex growth 18.2 percent yoy [obs:420643]. Corporate pulse ai infrastructure capex growth 78.55 percent yoy [obs:420642]. US future capacity pipeline 112974.47 MW modeled, up 21.2 percent yoy [obs:410691]. US real private fixed investment up 4.1 percent yoy [obs:410752].

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Group	Series	Latest	Year earlier	Change
Corporate pulse	Corporate pulse: semiconductor capacity capex growth Derived	18.2 percent change yoy (2026-09-03, obs 420643)	n/a	n/a
Corporate pulse	Corporate pulse: ai infrastructure capex growth Derived	78.55 percent change yoy (2026-09-03, obs 420642)	n/a	n/a
Capacity pipeline	US future capacity pipeline, 24 months Modeled	112,974.47 MW (2026-08-01, obs 410691)	93,240.11 (2025-08-01)	19,734.37 (+21.2%)
Capital spending	US real private fixed investment Observed	4,645.79 billions of chained 2017 dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate (2026-04-01, obs 410752)	4,461.51 (2025-04-01)	184.28 (+4.1%)

The US pipeline and response measures are on the capacity page; bottleneck assessments are on bottlenecks.

Section 7 of 9

Scenarios

Base is the champion model's point estimate; upside and downside are the bounds of its 80 percent interval. No probability beyond the interval's own is assigned.

AI narrative Modeled

No forecast is published.

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

No forecast published for this topic yet.

Section 8 of 9

What to watch

Each indicator is a stored series with a numeric threshold; the reading says which side of it the latest value sits on.

AI narrative Modeled

Corporate pulse semiconductor capacity capex growth 18.2 percent yoy against threshold 0, rising confirms easing [obs:420643]. US future capacity pipeline 112974.47 MW, 21.1651 percent yoy against threshold 0, rising confirms easing [obs:410691]. Rare earth production top-3 country concentration 89.7 percent against threshold 80, falling confirms easing [obs:409075].

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

Corporate pulse: semiconductor capacity capex growth

Derived

Level: 18.2 percent change yoy (2026-09-03)Threshold: 0 percent change yoy

On the easing side of the threshold · rising confirms easing

A positive pulse means the curated semiconductor companies report capacity growing.

US future capacity pipeline, 24 months

Modeled

Year over year: +21.2% (2026-08-01)Threshold: 0%

On the easing side of the threshold · rising confirms easing

Power for new load has to come from the generation pipeline.

Rare earth production top-3 country concentration

Derived

Level: 89.7 percent of world production (2025)Threshold: 80 percent of world production

On the worsening side of the threshold · falling confirms easing

Concentration above 80 percent (the series is in percent) leaves magnet supply exposed to one policy decision.

Section 9 of 9

Forecast track record

Backtests are rolling-origin, out of sample; live evaluations compare published forecasts with the realised values.

AI narrative Modeled

No forecast keys for this topic, so there is no track record. Evidence: none.

Written by grok-4.3 over the numbers in this snapshot only, validated against them (every figure and cited id had to be in the snapshot), run f80b6b9d, prompt 1.0.0. It adds no facts.

No forecast keys are attached to this topic, so there is no track record to show.

The full scorecard is at /forecasts/scorecard.

Provenance

Snapshot: 51 · 2026-10-19 00:22 UTC · navigator_view_v1+navigator_topics_v1
Gaps stated: 3
AI narrative: grok-4.3, run f80b6b9d-feb4-4444-8981-142246f085b7, prompt 1.0.0, 14 ids cited
Earlier snapshots: 43 (2026-10-12 00:12 UTC), 35 (2026-10-05 00:12 UTC), 27 (2026-09-28 00:12 UTC), 19 (2026-09-21 00:12 UTC), 11 (2026-09-14 00:14 UTC), 3 (2026-09-07 22:35 UTC)

Every value on this page is a stored observation (obs ids shown), a forecast record, a mechanism or a relationship row, or a percentile computed from those the same way the relevance engine computes its features. Series the config references but the site does not store are listed as gaps under their section, never filled in.